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WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH
CAUSES OF ACTION - SUGGESTIONS FOR A
CONSISTENT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, American courts have been con-
fronted with an unprecedented number of actions seeking to
impose liability on another, usually a physician, for wrongfully
causing a child to be born.1 These actions fall into two general
categories. "Wrongful life" actions are those brought by or on
behalf of an infant claiming that he was born into a disadvan-
tageous life by reason of another's negligence.2 "Wrongful
birth" actions, on the other hand, are brought by the parents
or family of a wrongfully born child demanding compensation
for losses they have sustained as the result of the birth.3 It is
essential to distinguish these two kinds of cases since most
courts have treated them quite differently.4 Further, it is im-
portant not to confuse these actions with a suit resulting from
a prenatal injury. Instead of asserting that the defendant's act
or omission caused a defective condition in the child, wrongful
life and wrongful birth suits involve a claim that the defen-
dant's negligence actually caused the child's birth.5
1. Although the earliest wrongful birth cause of action dates back to 1934 (See
Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934)), all but a handful of
the claims handled by appellate courts have arisen in the 1970's.
2. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d
766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Troppi v. Scarf, 31
Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155, 352
N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219
N.W.2d 242 (1974).
4. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); in which each court, confronted with both a wrongful life and
a wrongful birth action, denied the former and allowed the latter.
5. See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, , 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979); Gleitman v. Cos-
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As the number of wrongful life and wrongful birth cases
grows, it becomes increasingly important for courts to formu-
late a coherent framework within which to analyze these
claims. In most instances, the courts have failed to rise to this
challenge. While wrongful life causes of action have for the
most part been rejected,6 there continues to be some dispute
and confusion regarding the appropriate rationale for denial
of the claims.7 The theoretical problems presented by a
wrongful birth claim are even more pronounced, causing dis-
similar conclusions with respect to whether such a claim ought
to be recognized,8 and what damages, if any, may properly be
recovered." In order to propose a rational and satisfactory an-
alytical approach to these difficult claims, it is necessary to
trace the development of the wrongful life and wrongful birth
causes of action and explore and evaluate recent analytical
trends.
II. REJECTION OF WRONGFUL LIFE ACTIONS: SEARCH FOR A
RATIONALE
There are two basic varieties of wrongful life actions. The
first involves a child born out of wedlock who claims another's
tortious conduct caused him to be born and suffer the stigma
of illegitimacy.10 The second, and more common type of
wrongful life action, is brought by or on behalf of a physically
or mentally impaired child against a physician whose alleged
negligence caused the child's birth.11 The claim in this latter
grove, 49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 690-91 (1967); Torts-Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life, 44 Mo. L. REv. 167, 168-69 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Torts -
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life].
6. Only two courts have held that a child has a cause of action for its own wrong-
ful birth. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, - Cal. App. 3d -, 165 Cal. Rptr.
477 (1980); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977). However, the
Park decision was subsequently reversed. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978).
7. See text accompanying notes 13-53 infra.
8. See notes 70-108 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 127-157 and accompanying text infra.
10. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963); Williams v.
State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966); Slawek v. Stroh, 62
Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
11. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). But see Stills v. Gratton, 55
[Vol. 63:611
WRONGFUL BIRTH
type of action is not that the defendant physician caused the
child's defects, but that he caused the actual birth by negli-
gently failing to provide the child's parents with information
which would have prompted them to prevent or terminate the
mother's pregnancy.12
The first two wrongful life actions brought before appellate
courts were of the first variety. In Zepeda v. Zepeda,13 an Illi-
nois court considered a complaint filed on behalf of an illegiti-
mate infant against the child's father alleging that he had in-
duced the child's mother to engage in sexual relations by
promises of marriage when, in fact, he was already married.
The complaint further alleged that the father's wrongful con-
duct caused the child to be conceived and born.1 4 The plaintiff
sought damages for the deprivation of his right to be a legiti-
mate child, to have a normal home and family, to inherit from
and through his father and for being stigmatized as a bas-
tard.15 Though finding that the father's conduct was tortious
and discussing the hardships faced by an illegitimate child,"
the court nonetheless denied the child's claim stating:
Recognition of the Plaintiff's claim means creation of a new
tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. The legal implica-
tions of such a tort are vast, the social impact could be stag-
gering .... Encouragement would extend to all others born
into the world under conditions they might regard as
adverse.17
Thus, due to the far-reaching social implications involved in
allowing such a claim, the court determined that recognition
of the plaintiff's cause of action could come only from the leg-
islature after a thorough study of the consequences.1 "
A similar rationale was adopted in Williams v. State.1 9 In
Williams an infant born out of wedlock to a mentally defi-
Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976), in which a healthy child brought an
action against a physician whose negligence caused his birth.
12. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 771, 233 N.W.2d 372, 374 (1975).
13. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
14. Id. at 246, 190 N.E.2d at 851.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 255, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
17. Id. at 259-60, 190 N.E.2d at 858.
18. Id. at 262, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
19. 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
19801
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
cient mother as a result of a sexual assault on the mother
while she was confined to a state institution, filed suit against
the State of New York claiming the State had negligently
failed to prevent the assault and had thereby caused the child
to be conceived and born. As in Zepeda, the child demanded
compensation for injuries suffered as a result of its being an
illegitimate child. In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals of
New York cited Zepeda and held that it would not recognize a
cause of acton for "[b]eing born under one set of circum-
stances rather than another.
20
The public policy concerns expressed by the Zepeda and
Williams courts were echoed nearly ten years later in Slawek
v. Stroh.21 Confronted with a complaint virtually identical to
the one in Zepeda,22 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
although it probably had the power to recognize a cause of
action for wrongful life, 23 the "vast social ramifications" which
would attend the creation of such an action made it "the type
of public policy decision that should be made by the people of
this state or their elected legislative representatives. '24
Against the backdrop of these so-called "illegitimate-child
cases" and their broad public policy arguments, the second
variety of wrongful life actions appeared: those brought by
impaired infants against negligent physicians. Though courts
were less comfortable applying the Zepeda policy arguments
to a defective child case, they continued to cite the ilegiti-
mate-child cases as authority for the proposition that a cause
of action for wrongful life was contrary to public policy. 25 Sev-
eral commentators have lamented over the fact that the first
20. Id. at 484, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 887, 223 N.E.2d at 344.
21. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
22. Although the child's allegations in Slawek v. Stroh were very similar to those
of the child in Zepeda v. Zepeda, the claim arose in a somewhat different context. In
Slawek the child filed a counterclaim after he had been joined as a defendant in an
action brought by its father seeking to establish his paternity. See 62 Wis. 2d at 300,
301, 215 N.W.2d at 13.
23. The court held that it probably had the power to create a wrongful life cause
of action by virtue of Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 9 which reads: "Every person is entitled to
a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his
person, property, or character; . . ." 62 Wis. 2d at 317, 215 N.W.2d at 22.
24. 62 Wis. 2d at 318, 215 N.W.2d at 22.
25. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, -, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (citing
Zepeda and Williams and noting that wrongful life claims had been denied for "pub-
lic policy reasons"); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 772, 233 N.W.2d
372, 375 (citing Slawek and stating that although the public policy considerations
[Vol. 63:611
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wrongful life claims were the rather "frivolous" illegitimate-
child cases, which have been characterized as "very poor vehi-
cles through which to argue for the creation of a new cause of
action. ' 26 Indeed, there are important ways in which one type
of action varies from the other. First, the defendant fathers in
Zepeda and Slawek were as much responsible for the fact of
the child's illegitimacy as they were for its birth.17 In an ac-
tion against a physician, on the other hand, the child claims
the defendant's negligence caused its life, but not the defec-
tive condition from which it suffers. Thus, to the extent they
complain of the child's condition rather than its birth, the il-
legitimate child suits may not be wrongful life actions at all.
Second, the defective child actions more closely resemble a
traditional tort claim for medical malpractice. A physician has
breached his duty to fully inform his patient and his negli-
gence has resulted in the birth of a child with serious mental
or physical defects. Finally, the fact that the results of the
defendant's negligence in a defective child action are more se-
vere than those in an illegitimate child action may serve to
distinguish the two.28 Whether or not courts have taken notice
of the foregoing distinctions, they have expressed their dissat-
isfaction with using a Zepeda-type approach when faced with
a defective child case, simply by more carefully considering
the latter claims and finding more substantial reasons for de-
nying them.
The first, and perhaps most influential wrongful life case
involving an impaired child was Gleitman v. Cosgrove.29 In
Gleitman, it was alleged that the defendant physicians had
informed Mrs. Gleitman that the measles she had contracted
during the first month of her pregnancy would have no effect
on her child. Subsequently, she gave birth to a son who had
serious physical defects caused by the rubella. Two causes of
there were based upon different facts, they are to be accorded some weight).
26. Torts - Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, supra note 5, at 177; Note, Lia-
bility for Wrongfully Causing One to be Born: Development of a Tort for "Wrongful
Life," 10 UWLA L. REv. 53, 55-56 (1978).
27. But see Torts - Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, supra note 5, at 177 n.55
where the author notes that Zepeda arguably fits the wrongful life mold since the
father could not have married the mother and thereby legitimated the child.
28. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, - Cal. App. 3d . . 165 Cal.
Rptr. 477, 486 (1980).
29. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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action were asserted against the physicians, one by the par-
ents3" and the other on behalf of the child, each claiming that
the defendants' negligence deprived the mother of the oppor-
tunity to abort the pregnancy and prevent the birth of a de-
fective child. Both the parents and the child sought compen-
sation for the "wrongful birth" the defendants had caused.
Both causes of action were dismissed upon a motion for non-
suit.
In considering the child's claim, the Gleitman majority
was careful to point out that there was no suggestion that the
defendants could have done anything that would have de-
creased the possibility that the infant, then in gestation,
would be born with defects. 1 Therefore, the infant was re-
quired to claim not that he should have been born without
defects, but that he should not have been born at all.32 The
court went on to note that since the measure of damages in
tort actions is compensatory, the infant plaintiff was asking
the court to measure the difference between his life with de-
fects against the "utter void of non-existence."33 The court
concluded that the child's claim must be rejected since "[b]y
asserting that he should not have been born, the infant plain-
tiff [made] it logically impossible for a court to measure his
alleged damages because of the impossibility of making -the
comparison required by compensatory remedies. ' 3 4 The
Gleitman court's "unascertainable damage" rationale became
fairly well accepted, and a number of courts adopted the no-
tion as the basis for denying wrongful life claims arising from
fact situations similar to the Gleitman case.35
However, the rationale is not without its detractors.3 6 Jus-
30. See text accompanying notes 86 & 87 supra, for a discussion of the parents'
claim.
31. 49 N.J. at -, 227 A.2d at 691.
32. Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 692.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900,
386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1978); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 532,
313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503-04 (1970), appeal dismissed mem., 27 N.Y.2d 804, 315
N.Y.S.2d 863, 264 N.E.2d 354 (1970); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, __, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (1979); Torts -
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, supra note 5, at 181; Note, A Cause of Action for
"Wrongful Life", 55 MINN. L. REv. 58, 62-67 (1970); Note, Liability for Wrongfully
[Vol. 63:611
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tice Jacobs, dissenting in Gleitman, contended that a "judicial
system engaged daily in evaluating such matters as pain and
suffering which admittedly have 'no known dimensions math-
ematical or financial"' was equipped to evaluate the harm
caused by the physicians' breach of their legal duty in the
Gleitman case. 7 Further, to deny all relief, while relieving the
wrongdoer of all liability, merely because the damages cannot
be ascertained with certainty is a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice.3 8 Justice Jacobs' arguments might be ex-
pected to be particularly persuasive in those states, such as
Wisconsin, which have "right to remedy" provisions in their
state constitutions.3 9
Some commentators have suggested that the proper
method of evaluating an infant plaintiff's damages is to sim-
ply compensate the child for pain and suffering it has exper-
ienced by reason of the doctor having caused its birth and
thereafter off-set whatever benefits the trier of fact deter-
mines have accrued to the child as a result of its birth.0 Pre-
sumably, this would avoid the "being or nothingness"
problems involved in the Gleitman approach.
In light of the foregoing arguments, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court was persuaded to rethink its "unascertainable
damage" rationale when considering a wrongful life claim in
the recent case of Berman v. Allan.41 There, the court held
that although difficulty in ascertaining damages might be a
relevant factor in evaluating a claim, it would be reluctant to
deny the validity of a wrongful life claim solely upon that ba-
sis. 42 However, the court felt there was a different reason to
conclude the child's claim must fall: the child had suffered no
legally cognizable damage by being brought into existence.
Observing the reverence with which life is regarded in our na-
tion's constitution and in our society, the court determined
Causing One to be Born: Development of a Tort for "Wrongful Life", supra note 26,
at 61-62.
37. 49 N.J. at _, 227 A.2d at 704 (dissenting opinion).
38. Id. (citing to Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555 (1931)).
39. See WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9; but see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
40. Note, Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to be Born: Development of a
Tort for "Wrongful Life", supra note 26, at 61.
41. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
42. Id. at -, 404 A.2d at 12.
1980]
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that "life - whether experienced with or without a major
handicap - is more precious than non-life. 43
Presented this way, the New Jersey court's reasoning in
Berman is subject to criticism. First, the court simply appears
to be making the balance that it held was impossible or diffi-
cult to make in Gleitman. In essence, the court held as a mat-
ter of law that as between being and the "utter void of non-
existence," being is always preferable. Thus, although the
court purports to be no longer concerned with the measure of
damages, it is through that measuring process itself that the
court justifies denying the infant's cause of action. Further,
one commentator has complained that even if the court is jus-
tified in taking a "measure of damages" approach, it has no
basis for creating an "irrebuttable presumption that existence,
no matter how onerous, is preferable to nonexistence or
nonbirth."' 44 Though many persons afflicted with birth defects
may lead meaningful and productive lives, all cannot. Those
children, for example, born with defects so serious that they
cannot experience those pleasures which make life worthwhile
but must endure substantial physical pain and mental tor-
ment, can hardly be said to be benefited by the mere act of
breathing.45 Since it would appear, in situations such as these,
that reasonable men could differ as to whether a child suf-
fered an injury by being born in its impaired condition, a de-
termination by a trier, of fact would be preferable to the
Berman court's irrebuttable presumption.
Though problems exist with the analysis used in Berman,
there seemed to be a shift in focus toward what now appears
to be the most recent analytical trend in wrongful life cases;
that is, evaluating the rights and interests purportedly inter-
fered with by the defendant physician rather than the nature
and amount of damage suffered by the child. The first case in
which this right and interest approach was most clearly
adopted was in Park v. Chessin.46 There, Mrs. Park had con-
sulted the defendant obstetricians after giving birth to a son
who suffered from a hereditary kidney disorder and died sev-
43. Id.
44. Torts - Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, supra note 5, at 180.
45. Id. at 180 n.72. One example of such an affliction is Tay-Sachs disease. A child
born with this defect suffers two or three years of substantial pain before dying.
46. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
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eral days after birth. The defendants were claimed to have ad-
vised Mrs. Park that the affliction was not hereditary and that
there was practically no chance a future child would suffer
from the disease. A year later, a second child was born to Mrs.
Park. Contrary to the defendants' projections, the child had
the kidney disease and survived for only two and one half
years. The parents brought an action claiming damages for
medical expenses, emotional distress and loss of the wife's ser-
vices, and an action was brought on behalf of the deceased
child's estate claiming damages for pain and suffering. The
trial term of the Supreme Court of New York denied the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss 47 and the appellate division af-
firmed, holding that the child, as well as the parents, stated a
cause of action.48 With respect to the child's cause of action
the appellate division determined that the defendants had in-
terfered with "the fundamental right of a child to be born as a
whole, functional human being," and that a right of action ex-
isted based upon that violation.49 The New York Court of Ap-
peals was not of the same mind, and reversed the appellate
division, ruling that there was absolutely no precedent for rec-
ognizing such a right. °
This absence of precedent apparently caused the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals little concern when it recognized a cause
of action for wrongful life in Curlender v. Bio-Science Labo-
ratories.51 In Curlender, a child born with Tay-Sachs disease
brought suit against two laboratories her parents had retained
to administer tests designed to disclose whether either parent
was a carrier of genes which could result in the conception
and birth of a child with the disease. It was alleged that the
parents received "incorrect and inaccurate" information due
to the defendants' negligence and thereby failed to avail
47. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
48. 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
49. Id. at 88, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
50. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900, 386 N.E.2d
807, 812 (1978). The Becker case and the Park case were combined for appeal to the
Court of Appeals of New York; See also Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. Super. Ct. -, 408
A.2d 496 (1980).
51. - Cal. App. 3d -, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980).
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themselves of an eugenic abortion which could have prevented
the defective birth.2
After discussing, and apparently approving of, the New
York Appellate Division's recognition of a "fundamental right
to be born as a whole, functional human being,"5 3 the
Curlender court stated:
We have no difficulty in ascertaining and finding the exis-
tence of a duty owed by medical laboratories engaged in ge-
netic testing to parents and their as yet unborn children to
use ordinary care in administration of available tests for the
purpose of providing information concerning potential ge-
netic defects in the unborn.5
However, even assuming the defendant in Curlender owed a
duty to the plaintiff child, it must still be determined what
right or interest the defendant has interfered with by reason
of its negligence. It cannot, of course, be said that had the
defendant not been negligent the child would have been born
without defects. The most that can be said is that but for the
negligence the child would not have been born at all. Thus,
the right or interest asserted on behalf of the child is not the
fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human
being, but the right not to be born at all. No such right, nor
even one analogous to it, has ever been recognized in our judi-
cial system and it is unlikely such a right will ever be ac-
knowledged.55 If one has not interfered with a legally pro-
tected right or interest of another, there is no tortious conduct
with respect to the other.5 0 As recognized by the Alabama Su-
preme Court in a recent wrongful life action:
Fundamental to the recognition of such a cause of action is
the notion that the defendant has violated some legal right
52. Id. at -, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
53. Id. at -, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 484.
54. Id. at -, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
55. Although many jurisdictions recognize a physician's duty not to negligently
harm an unborn child, a right not to be born does not logically follow. Principles
applied to prenatal tort actions are different than those applied to wrongful life ac-
tions. Different too are the principles relevant to the "right to die" cases. See In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Note, The Right to Die a Natural Death: A
Discussion of In re Quinlan and the California Natural Death Act, 46 CIN. L. REv.
192 (1977).
56. W. PROSSER, TORTS (4th ed. 1971) § 53 at 325.
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of plaintiff's and as a result she has suffered injury ....
We hold that there is no legal right not to be born and the
plaintiff has no cause of action for 'wrongful life.'5 7
By concentrating their attention on the rights and inter-
ests involved in a wrongful life action, it would seem that
courts could avoid the pitfalls of the other rationales dis-
cussed above. Since the physician has interfered with no le-
gally protected interest of the child and is therefore not sub-
ject to any tort liability, the difficult "being or nothingness"
damage questions are no longer relevant. Similarly, the argu-
ments that no right should exist without a remedy to protect
it, or that a wrongdoer should not be allowed to escape liabil-
ity would no longer be germane. There simply is no right not
to be born on the part of the child and, thus, no liability on
the part of the physician. Though rather simplistic in form,
the "legally protected right" analysis appears to offer the most
rational basis for evaluating wrongful life claims.
Ill. WRONGFUL BIRTH: THE PARENTS' CAUSE OF ACTION
Courts have generally recognized that parents bringing a
wrongful birth action stand in a much different position than
a child asserting a wrongful life claim .5  The parents seek
compensation not for the new life itself but for the pecuniary
loss and the pain and suffering which result from the birth; a
birth the parents would have avoided but for the negligence of
the defendant.
Wrongful birth actions may result from a variety of fact
situations. Parents of a child born with "rubella syndrome"
have sued claiming they would have sought an eugenic abor-
tion had they been properly advised of possible birth de-
fects;59 parents of a child with genetic impairments have
57. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978). Accord, Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
58. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, -, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1978); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773-74, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975). The dissenting
opinion in Dumer noted that under Wisconsin law a parent's cause of action for inju-
ries sustained by a child is derivative from the child's cause of action and concluded
that the parent's claim must fail if the child's does. 69 Wis. 2d at 779, 233 N.W.2d at
379. However, most courts have recognized that a parent's cause of action for wrong-
ful birth alleges an injury to the parents themselves.
59. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Jacobs v.
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claimed that they would have avoided conception or termi-
nated the mother's pregnancy had the attending physician not
failed to detect the genetic problem, 0 or properly test for the
impairment by means of amniocentesis;"' and parents of a
normal, healthy, but unplanned child have brought a cause of
action claiming their decision not to bear the child was frus-
trated by a surgeon's negligent performance of a sterilization
operation,62 a physician's failure to make a timely diagnosis of
the mother's pregnancy" or a pharmacist's negligence in filing
a prescription for oral contraceptives. 4
The conclusions reached by various courts regarding the
propriety of a wrongful birth cause of action and the extent of
damages recoverable, have been as diverse as the fact situa-
tions in which these claims arise. 5 Particularly, courts' analy-
ses have differed depending upon whether the defendants'
negligence intervened prior to conception, thereby causing the
pregnancy itself, or after conception, thereby preventing the
parents from terminating the pregnancy, 6 and whether the
resulting child was normal and healthy, or born with some se-
Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766,
233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
60. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d
807 (1978).
61. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979). Amniocentesis is a proce-
dure involving the insertion of a long needle into a mother's uterus in order to obtain
a sample of amniotic fluid containing living fetal cells. Thereafter, through an analy-
sis of the number and structure of the cells' chromosomes, the presence of gross chro-
mosomal defects can be detected.
62. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409
(1976); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Terrell v.
Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
63. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck
v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
64. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
65. See Torts - Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, supra note 5, at 169-70 for a
concise compilation of the differing opinions of courts regarding recognition of the
wrongful birth cause of action and damages which are properly recoverable.
66. Where a third party's negligence intervenes prior to conception, as in the case
where a sterilization operation is negligently performed, the defendant's negligence
can be said to be the cause of the conception. These cases have sometimes been re-
ferred to as "wrongful conception" cases. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
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rious impairment. It is submitted that although these differ-
ing factual situations are relevant to the triers of fact's deter-
mination regarding the defendants' negligence and the extent
of the parents' injury, they should in no way influence an ap-
pellate court's recognition of the parents' cause of action for
all damages flowing from the defendants' wrongful conduct.
Once it is uniformly recognized that public policy, as well as
constitutional considerations, mandate protection of the par-
ents' right to procreative self-determination, a wrongful birth
cause of action must be allowed. Further, if courts come to
view the wrongful birth action simply as one sounding in tort
for medical malpractice, the trier of fact ought to be allowed
to determine the extent of the parents' injury after consider-
ing the particular family circumstances in a given case and the
impact of the new child's birth on those circumstances. Poli-
cies which courts have heretofore espoused in limiting recov-
erable damages should merely be considered by the trier of
fact as mitigating or aggravating the damages.
An evaluation and criticism of wrongful birth cases must
necessarily begin with a discussion of the public policy con-
cerns which have affected the recognition of a cause of ac-
tion.17 Following that discussion, the nature of the cause of
action for wrongful birth will be treated.6 8 Finally, the
problems involved in ascertaining and measuring the parents'
injuries will be explored.69
A. Public Policy and Recognition of a Cause of Action
The first wrongful birth actions arose at a time when abor-
tions, sterilization operations and other forms of birth control
were looked upon with some disfavor. This attitude on the
part of the general public, their state legislators and the
courts had an obvious influence on wrongful birth decisions.
In Christensen v. Thornby,70 the plaintiff husband had
sought a vasectomy operation so that his wife might avoid the
health hazards of another pregnancy. A Minnesota trial court
held that vasectomy operations were contrary to public policy
67. See text accompanying notes 70-108 infra.
68. See text accompanying notes 113-26 infra.
69. See text accompanying notes 127-57 infra.
70. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
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and the parents' cause of action, based upon the negligent
performance of that operation, was therefore dismissed.
Though affirming the dismissal,71 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that sterilization operations were not contrary to
public policy or common law principles and the claim could
not be rejected merely because the plaintiff had submitted to
a vasectomy operation. 2
More than two decades later the same question was ad-
dressed by a Pennsylvania court in Shaheen v. Knight.73 In
the Shaheen case, the court voiced its agreement with the
Christensen court and held that sterilization operations were
not against public policy. The Shaheen court stated that
"only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the
public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual
unanimity of opinion in regard to it" could a court thwart or
promote that policy on behalf of the community.74 There was,
the court ruled, no such unanimity of opinion regarding
sterilization. 75
In more recent decisions, courts have held without excep-
tion that sterilization for purposes of family planning is en-
tirely consistent with public policy.7 6 Although most of these
decisions have been based purely on public policy and opin-
ion, the constitutional dimension of the right to procreative
self-determination" has been noted by a number of modern
courts. In the 1976 case of Anonymous v. Hospital,78 a Con-
necticut Superior Court held that sterilization operations, in
addition to being consistent with public policy, were probably
constitutionally protected. Citing to Griswold v. Connecticut ,9
the court stated: "Whether the state can control the subject
71. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
72. Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125-26, 255 N.W. 620, 622 (1934).
73. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
74. Id. at 43.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Jackson v. Ander-
son, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41,
356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
77. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
78. 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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[sterilization] may be questioned in view of the fact that the
giving to married persons of information, instruction, and
medical advice on the means of preventing conception is now
clothed in a cloak of constitutional protection."80
The Supreme Court of Ohio went somewhat further in
Bowman v. Davis81 when it declared that "the choice not to
procreate, as part of one's right to privacy, has become (sub-
ject to certain limitations) a constitutional guarantee. '82 The
court went on to intimate that to impose liability on physi-
cians for the foreseeable consequences of all negligently per-
formed operations except those involving sterilization would
constitute a deprivation of equal protection. 3
In light of the changing public opinion regarding birth
control and the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade,"
the foregoing arguments would appear to be equally applica-
ble in those cases in which reluctant parents claim a physi-
cian's negligence deprived them of the opportunity to termi-
nate the mother's pregnancy. Protection of the mother's right
to an abortion, however, has not fared nearly as well when
pitted against public policy concerns.85 In Gleitman v. Cos-
grove,8e parents of an impaired child claimed that they were
denied the opportunity to avoid the birth of the defective
child due to the defendant physician's faulty advice that the
rubella contracted by the mother during the first month of
her pregnancy would have no effect on her child. Although the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated it would assume the
mother could have obtained a legal abortion, it went on to
hold that "substantial policy reasons prevent this Court from
allowing tort damages for the denial of the opportunity to
80. 33 Conn. Supp. at _, 366 A.2d at 205.
81. 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
82. Id. at 46, 356 N.E.2d at 499. There, the Bowman court cited to Roe as well as
Griswold. Thus, the court's rationale may be equally applicable to abortion even
though Bowman involved a sterilization.
83. Id.
84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that par-
ents have a constitutionally protected right to obtain an abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy free of state interference.
85. See generally Note, Wrongful Birth in the Abortion Context - Critique of
Existing Case Law and Proposal for Future Actions, 53 DEN. L.J. 501 (1976).
86. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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take an embryonic life."'87
Though the Gleitman case pre-dated the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, there are some indications that its
policy concerns live on. In Rieck v. Medical Protective Co.,s8
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a cause of action
against the physician who failed to diagnose the plaintiff's
pregnancy in time for her to obtain an abortion must be dis-
missed for public policy reasons. Roughly a year later, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court faced another "abortion case" in
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital.8 9 In Dumer, the parents of a
child born with "rubella syndrome" brought suit against a
physician for negligently failing to diagnose the rubella and
advise them of the availability of an abortion. The court con-
cluded that the doctor had no legal duty to counsel the par-
ents regarding the availability of an abortion, stating that the
question of the legal availability of an abortion, particularly
when the consultation took place prior to the Roe decision,
called for a legal rather than medical opinion.90 Although the
court allowed the action to survive a demurrer to the plain-
tiff's complaint on the theory that the physician had a duty to
properly diagnose the mother's rubella, it expressly left open
the possibility of precluding recovery based on public policy
concerns after the fact finding process was completed.9 1
When viewed against the background of the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Griswold and Roe, the views of
the New Jersey and Wisconsin courts appear to be unsound.
The expression of a public policy against providing a remedy
when one is prevented from terminating a pregnancy by the
negligent conduct of another, would seem to be inconsistent
with the recognition that a woman has an unqualified right to
a legal abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy. Fur-
ther, there is no persuasive reason to accord the right to ob-
tain an abortion any less protection than the right to use con-
87. Id. at -, 227 A.2d at 693.
88. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
89. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
90. Id. at 775-76, 233 N.W.2d at 376-77. Although Wisconsin law prohibited abor-
tions except where the mother's life or health was in danger at the time the facts in
Dumer took place, the court did not appear to limit its holding to the lack of a duty
to advise of abortion to pre-Roe cases.
91. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
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traceptives and undergo a sterilization operation. Therefore,
equal protection concerns may prevent denial of the parents'
cause of action for being denied the opportunity to terminate
the mother's pregnancy.92
Even admitting that the right to regulate the size of one's
family is not contrary to public policy and that it is therefore
entitled to the protection of the law, courts have refused to
recognize the parents' cause of action for wrongful birth on
the theory that public policy prevents the birth of a child as
being viewed as an injury to its parents. This issue most com-
monly arises where parents seek recovery for the costs of rear-
ing an unplanned but otherwise normal and healthy child.
After holding in the Christensen case that the father's va-
sectomy was not contrary to public policy and the parents'
claim would not be rejected on that account, the Minnesota
Supreme Court nonetheless denied a cause of action since the
plaintiff has "been blessed with the fatherhood of another
child."9 3 Similarly, the Shaheen court, while finding "no vir-
tual unanimity of opinion regarding sterilization," held that
"to allow damages for the normal birth of a normal child is
foreign to the universal public sentiment of the people."'1
Though the Christensen and Shaheen cases were decided
in 1934 and 1957, respectively, the so-called "blessing doc-
trine" is not without more modern advocates. 5 In the 1973
case of Terrell v. Garcia" a Texas court of appeals held in a
negligent sterilization wrongful birth case, that the benefits of
parenthood of a healthy child outweighed any damage as a
matter of law. There, the court declared:
Who can place a price tag on a child's smile or the parental
pride in a child's achievement? Even if we consider only the
economic point of view, a child is some security for the par-
ents' old age. Rather than attempt to value these intangible
benefits, our courts have simply determined that public sen-
timent recognizes that these benefits to the parents out-
92. See authorities cited in note 77 supra.
93. 192 Minn. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622.
94. 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43, 45.
95. Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
96. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
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weigh their economic loss in rearing and educating a
healthy, normal child.97
A year later this passage was cited with apparent approval by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co. 98
Modern adherents notwithstanding, the "blessing doc-
trine" must be rejected as an outmoded notion of public pol-
icy. Radical changes in the public's attitude toward birth con-
trol and the family, as well as the protection accorded family
planning rights by the United States Supreme Court support
the position that a child is not always a "blessing" to its fam-
ily. Indeed, a number of courts have rejected the notion that
the event the parents had sought to prevent is no injury to
them.9
In Troppi v. Scarf,100 parents of a normal, healthy, but un-
planned child brought suit against a pharmacist whose neg-
ligent filling of a prescription for oral contraceptives caused
the conception and birth of the child. The Michigan court re-
jected the defendant's argument that the birth of the child
did not constitute a damage to its parents as a matter of law.
The court declared that the argument that an unplanned
child results in no loss to its parents ignores the fact that tens
of millions of persons use contraceptives to avoid the very re-
sult the defendant contended was always a benefit, and never
a detriment.1 1 Thus, the parents' claim for the costs of rear-
ing the child stood.
The Minnesota Supreme Court came to a similar conclu-
sion in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic °2 where parents of a
healthy child commenced an action against a surgeon for, in-
ter alia, the costs of raising the child born due to the negli-
gent performance of a tubal ligation. The court stated it
would be "myopic" to declare today that the benefits of
parenthood outweighed the costs as a matter of law. Further,
97. Id. at 128.
98. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242.
99. Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978); Troppi v. Scarf,
31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
100. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511.
101. Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
102. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
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the court held that the time honored command to "be fruitful
and multiply" had "not only lost contemporary significance to
a growing number of potential parents but is contrary to pub-
lic policy embodied in the statutes encouraging family
planning."10 3
The New York Court of Claims recognized that the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Griswold militated against
denying the parents' wrongful birth claim in Rivera v.
State.10 4 The court in Rivera held that to accept the "blessing
doctrine" would be to "cast upon the sea of public opinion
what the Supreme Court has declared to be a matter of
strictly private concern."10 5
In the final analysis, public policy arguments based upon
the "blessing doctrine" must fail for the same reasons that
public policy arguments based upon unfavorable attitudes to-
ward abortion and contraception fail: the notion that an un-
planned child may cause a loss to its parents is consonant
with contemporary public policy and is supported by the Su-
preme Court's recognition of constitutionally protected family
planning rights.
While the changes in public attitudes and the scope of
constitutional protections accorded to privacy rights have
eroded the policy arguments against allowing wrongful birth
causes of action, other policy arguments have been advanced
in favor of recognizing such claims. As noted by the Minne-
sota Supreme Court in Sherlock, a number of states have en-
acted statutes expressing a strong public policy favoring fam-
fly planning.0 ' Refusal to allow a cause of action based upon
an interference with birth control would certainly be contrary
to that policy. Additionally, there are certain "social engineer-
ing" policies which would appear to promote recognition of a
wrongful birth cause of action. First, several commentators
have argued that as between two parties a loss ought to be
borne by the party best able to distribute the risk of loss
through such mechanisms as fee adjustments and liability in-
103. Id. at 175.
104. 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
105. Id. at -, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
106. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 146.80 (1977); Comment, Toward Greater Reproduc-
tive Freedom: Wisconsin's New Family Planning Act, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 509 (1979).
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surance. 10 7 In a wrongful birth action, that party would, of
course, be the defendant physician. Second, and more persua-
sive, is the concept that the threat of liability will furnish a
strong incentive to prevent potential harm, and thus en-
courage physicians to exercise due care when performing ster-
ilization operations, diagnosing problem pregnancies and
counseling with respect to the potential for birth defects. Con-
versely, rejection of the cause of action for wrongful birth
serves to render even the admittedly negligent physician free
of all responsibility for the loss occasioned by his
negligence.110
In light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that public
policy should not provide a stumbling block to the recognition
of wrongful birth claims. On the contrary, once present public
attitudes are properly characterized, it would appear that
public policy requires that such actions be allowed.
B. Nature of the Cause of Action for Wrongful Birth
Concluding that public policy does not prohibit a claim for
wrongful birth does not remove all barriers to recognition of a
cause of action. A number of courts have refused to "create" a
new cause of action for wrongful birth, while others, after al-
lowing the claim, have severely limited damages recoverable
by the plaintiff. These limitations reflect a fundamental mis-
understanding of the cause of action for wrongful birth which
can be dispelled by an analysis of the elements of such an
action.
Plaintiffs have, with varying degrees of success, brought
wrongful birth actions based upon the legal theories of breach
of contract or warranty, misrepresentation, and deceit.10 The
107. See Note, Remedy for the Reluctant Parent: Physicians' Liability for the
Post-Sterilization Conception and Birth of Unplanned Children, 27 U. FLA. L. REv.
158 (1974).
108. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977); Berman
v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, _, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, -,
404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (1978).
109. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (plaintiffs'
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for deception and breach of contract
for failure to sterilize plaintiff when performing a tubal ligation); Coleman v. Garri-
son, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975) (action for breach of warranty based on unsuccessful tubal
ligation must fail absent showing of express warranty supported by separate consider-
ation); Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (action for
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vast majority of complaints, however, sound in tort and allege
medical malpractice. 110 In order to recover under tort theory,
it must be shown that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty,
that the defendant breached that duty and that the breach
was the cause of some harm suffered by the plaintiff.111
The duty owed by a physician to his patient is not ordina-
rily difficult to establish. When treating or advising a patient,
a physician will not be liable for medical malpractice so long
as he employs, with due care, that degree of skill and learning
commonly possessed by members of his profession in good
standing.1 2 Thus, if a defendant physician fails to conform to
this requisite standard of conduct when performing a sterili-
zation operation, advising prospective parents regarding the
possibility of birth defects, or diagnosing a pregnancy or
problems therewith in the course of treating the mother, he
has breached the duty owed to his patient and should be lia-
ble for any resulting injury.
Establishing a breach of this duty is somewhat more diffi-
cult. Where a sterilization operation is concerned, evidence
of the negligence is usually concealed in the plaintiff's body,
thus creating substantial proof problems. The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is of no assistance to the plaintiff."' Since re-
canalization is possible in both tubal ligations and vasecto-
breach of express warranty based on unsuccessful sterilization operation allowed);
Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 IM. App. 3d 51, 29 IM. Dec. 216, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979)
(counts based upon breach of contract and warranty in action for negligent perform-
ance of abortion properly dismissed); Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265
N.W.2d 411 (1978) (failure of physician to advise plaintiff that agreed upon steriliza-
tion not performed during caesarean section is breach of contract).
110. But see Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (defen-
dant to a wrongful birth action grounded in tort theory was a pharmacist who alleg-
edly failed to properly fill a contraceptive prescription).
111. W. PROSSER, TORTS (4th ed. 1971) § 30 at 143.
112. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975). Courts have not gener-
ally found any difficulty in extending the physician's duty to the spouse of a patient
in a wrongful birth situation. For a discussion of potential problems in extending
such a duty, see Wrongful Conception, 5 WiLuIAM MITCHELL L. REv. 464, 481-83
(1979).
113. See W. PROSSER, ToRTs (4th ed. 1971) § 39 at 214. Res ipsa loquitur is a
procedural device which allows a plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence by
showing (1) that the result is not one which ordinarily occurs in the absence of negli-
gence, (2) that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality involved in




mies, a pregnancy could result in the absence of any negli-
gence on the part of the physician.114 However, in Vaughn v.
Shelton,1 1 5 where the plaintiff had become pregnant four
months after the performance of a tubal ligation, the court
stated that considering the short period of time that elapsed
between the operation and the pregnancy, "a reasonable con-
clusion from that fact might be that one or both of the tubes
were not closed whether by negligence or a mere over-
sight. .. ."I'l The plaintiff's best means of detecting any ir-
regularity in the performance of the operation is to consult
pathological tests performed on the matter removed from the
plaintiff patient's body. If the physician has failed to remove
sections of the fallopian tubes or the vas deferens, or has re-
moved insufficient lengths, negligence may be established.117
In cases where the plaintiffs claim they have been deprived
of the opportunity to terminate the mother's pregnancy due
to a physician's failure to detect a particular condition, the
physician will be subject to liability if the parents can prove
that the physician's failure to detect the condition fell short of
the requisite professional standard of conduct. Note, however,
that one court has held that even where the possibility of a
birth defect exists, a physician has no duty to advise the po-
tential parents of the availability of abortion.11 8
If the plaintiff parents succeed in proving a breach of the
duty, they must further show that the defendant's negligence
caused them some injury. It would seem that the causal link
between a negligently performed sterilization operation and a
subsequent pregnancy would be obvious. Nonetheless, in Cus-
todio v. Bauer,11 9 the defendant argued that sexual relations
between the plaintiff and her husband constituted an inter-
vening cause of a subsequent pregnancy thereby breaking the
causal chain between the surgeon's alleged negligence in the
114. See Herring v. Knab, 458 F. Supp. 359 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Lane v. Cohn, 201
So. 2d 804 (Fla. App. 1967); Wrongful Conception as a Cause of Action and Damages
Recoverable, 44 Mo. L. REv. 589, 597 (1979); Wrongful Conception, 5 WILLIAM
MrrchELL L. REV. 464, 483-84 (1979).
115. 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. App.), cert. denied, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. 1974).
116. Id. at 874.
117. See, e.g., Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976); Bow-
man v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
118. Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
119. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
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performance of a tubal ligation and the plaintiff's injuries. De-
claring that the test of whether an intervening act breaks the
causal link is the foreseeability of the act occurring, the court
held that "it is difficult to conceive how the very act the con-
sequences of which the operation was designed to forestall,
can be considered unforeseeable. '120
Establishing the causal element in post-conception negli-
gence cases may be somewhat more problematic. In these
cases, the parents claim that had the doctor informed them of
a particular condition they would have terminated the
mother's pregnancy. Thus, the physician's negligence can be
said to be a cause of the child's birth only if the parents would
actually have sought an abortion. In Rieck v. Medical Protec-
tive Co.,121 parents of a normal, healthy child brought suit
against a physician who had failed to diagnose the plaintiff
mother's condition in time for her to obtain an abortion. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the action partly because
they felt allowing recovery in such a case would open the way
for fraudulent claims. The court stated that since the claim
that the parents would have sought an abortion but for the
defendant's negligence involved "such subjective testimony as
to a state of mind or intention" that to allow recovery upon a
failure to make a timely diagnosis of pregnancy would en-
courage parents "if not to invent an intent to prevent preg-
nancy, at least to deny any possibility of change of mind or
attitude before the action contemplated was taken."1 22
A year later in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,1 23 the
same court took a different view where a defective child had
been born due to an alleged failure to diagnose rubella. There,
the court simply held that in order to complete a cause of ac-
tion, the plaintiffs had to convince the trier of fact that the
wife would have sought and submitted to an abortion.1 24 Pre-
sumably, the Wisconsin Supreme Court felt that the claim of
the parents in Dumer was more credible than that of the par-
ents in Rieck because of the presence of birth defects. How-
ever, it would seem that in any event, the credibility of the
120. Id. at -, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
121. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
122. Id. at 519, 219 NW.2d at 245.
123. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
124. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
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parents' testimony in light of the surrounding circumstances
is more a question for the trier of fact than for an appellate
court. There may be proof problems involved in post-concep-
tion negligence cases, but parents should not be denied the
opportunity to prove their case.
If plaintiff parents are able to show negligence on the part
of the physician and establish the causal link between that
negligence and the birth of the child, and further, it is admit-
ted that an unplanned or impaired child may not under all
circumstances be a blessing to its parents, but may occasion
some loss, it becomes apparent that a wrongful birth action
fits the mold of a traditional medical malpractice claim. When
viewed in this light, the argument, advanced by some, that
courts must await some legislative activity before acknowledg-
ing wrongful birth claims is unpersuasive. As one court has
observed, "[t]he fundamental principles of tort law were cre-
ated by courts not legislatures," and therefore parents should
be "affordea the opportunity of proving the customary ele-
ments of duty, negligence, proximate cause and damages. ' 125
Once a wrongful birth action is properly characterized as a
traditional tort action, the plaintiffs are entitled to compensa-
tion for all damages flowing from the defendant's negligent
conduct. In an action for recovery of losses sustained as a re-
sult of a negligently performed vasectomy, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court recently stated:
Analytically, such an action is indistinguishable from an or-
dinary medical negligence action where a plaintiff alleges
that a physician has breached a duty of care owed to him
with resulting injurious consequences. Where the purpose of
the physician's actions is to prevent conception or birth, ele-
mentary justice requires that he be held legally responsible
for the consequences which have in fact occurred. 126
Just what the "consequences" of a wrongful birth are, and to
what extent the plaintiffs ought to be compensated for those
consequences is a question some courts have had a great diffi-
culty determining.
125. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 162, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (1978); accord,
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413-14, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901, 386 N.E.2d 807,
813 (1978); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 231, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 268 (1974).
126. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Minn. 1977).
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C. Damages in Wrongful Birth Action
Courts which have recognized a cause of action for wrong-
ful birth have generally allowed the plaintiff to seek recovery
for the expenses of an unsuccessful sterilization operation,2
pain and suffering attending the occurrence or continuation of
the pregnancy,128 pain and suffering associated with and medi-
cal costs attendant to the delivery of the child,129 lost wages of
the wife, 13 0 loss of consortium, 81 and, where the child is born
with impairments, the expenses occasioned by a physically or
mentally defective child as contrasted to a normal, healthy
child. 32 Courts have been at odds, and continue to be at odds
regarding recovery for the costs of rearing a normal, healthy
child, and, in the case of an impaired child, the costs of rais-
ing the child other than those occasioned by its defect. While
the damages would appear to be properly compensable be-
cause they are costs the parents would have avoided but for
the negligence of the physician, several arguments have been
advanced in opposition to allowing recovery.
1. Mitigation of Damages
On occasion, defendants in wrongful birth actions have
contended that the plaintiffs could have mitigated their dam-
ages by aborting an unwanted pregnancy or placing the child
for adoption after birth.133 In the context of a tort action, this
argument would presumably be based upon the "rule of
avoidable consequences."' ' This doctrine requires a plaintiff
127. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
128. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967);
Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45
A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
129. See, e.g., authorities cited in note 128 supra.
130. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sher-
lock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Ziemba v. Steinberg, 45
A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974).
131. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
132. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
133. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Martineau v.
Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
134. W. PROssER, TORTS (4th ed. 1971) § 65 at 422.
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to take any reasonable measures available to minimize the
financial consequences of a defendant's negligent conduct. If
the effort, risk, sacrifice or expense which the plaintiff must
incur in order to minimize the loss or injury is such that a
reasonable person under similar circumstances might well de-
cline to incur it, failure to do so will not preclude recovery of
full damages. 13 5 The question in a wrongful birth action is,
then, whether it is reasonable to require the plaintiffs to at-
tempt to mitigate their damages by terminating an unwanted
pregnancy or placing an unplanned or impaired child for
adoption.
Given the public controversy surrounding the issue of
abortion, there is a strong argument that it would not be rea-
sonable to require plaintiffs to minimize their damages by ter-
minating an unwanted pregnancy. In Rivera v. State,36 a New
York Court of Claims held that "a rule of law which required
the claimant to have an abortion would constitute an invasion
of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious kind.1' 7 The
court went on to state that a decision regarding abortion is for
the individual to make based upon her own religious, philo-
sophical or moral principles. The court noted that in the
minds of many people, there is a significant difference be-
tween sterilization as an appropriate method of family plan-
ning and abortion. The court offered the example of the Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, a group of over one-half million Christians
who believe that sterilization rests on the individual's con-
science while abortion is a serious wrong. 38 On the basis of
these considerations the Rivera court ruled that the failure of
the claimant to obtain an abortion would not affect her cause
of action. Several other courts have concurred in this view-
point,3 9 while no court has held that obtaining an abortion is
a reasonable means of mitigating damages.
Some courts have held that it is equally unreasonable to
require a plaintiff to place a child for adoption. 140 In Troppi v.
135. See C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1st ed. 1935) § 35 at 133.
136. 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
137. Id. at -. , 404 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
138. Id. n.6.
139. Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Still-
water Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
140. See authorities cited in note 139 supra.
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Scarf,"' a Michigan court of appeals declared that when de-
termining reasonableness, the best interests of the child must
be considered. The court held that the law had long recog-
nized the desirability of allowing a child to be reared by its
natural parents and the court concluded that a parent might
reasonably believe the child would be damaged by adoption.
Further, the court recognized that a living child gave rise to
emotional and spiritual bonds that a parent would justifiably
be reluctant to break. Regardless of whether the parents may
have wanted to conceive and rear a child, they might well feel
a legal and moral obligation to love and raise the child the
best they can, rather than to subject the child to rearing by
unknown persons. Finally, the Troppi court declared that par-
ents might conclude that they could not withstand the psy-
chological and emotional impact of rejecting the child and
placing it for adoption. Based upon these considerations, the
court reasoned that under the principle that a tortfeasor takes
his victim as he finds him, he cannot complain if the emo-
tional and mental makeup of the plaintiff parents is inconsis-
tent with aborting or placing the child for adoption. 42
Not all courts have agreed with the Troppi rationale."3S
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co.,'" stated:
To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the en-
tire cost of its upbringing to a physician who failed to deter-
mine or inform them of the fact of pregnancy would be to
create a new category of surrogate parent.
... It is retention of benefits - the parents keeping their
child, and seeking to transfer only the financial costs of its
upbringing to the doctor - that is a relevant factor in eval-
uating the public policy considerations involved. 14
The Wisconsin court thereafter refused to recognize the plain-
tiffs' cause of action based upon public policy concerns.
141. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
142. Id.
143. See Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa.
D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974).
144. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
145. Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45.
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What may be criticized about the Wisconsin court's ratio-
nale is that it allows a factor which could be considered in
mitigation of damages to preclude recovery of damages alto-
gether. While one might reasonably infer from a parent's re-
fusal to place an unplanned child for adoption that the parent
feels that it derives some benefit from having the child, there
is no reason to prevent the plaintiff parent from attempting to
recover for the financial losses occasioned by the birth of the
child. What some courts have concluded is that the trier of
fact ought to be able to consider the intangible benefits that
accrue to a parent by virtue of having a child, and offset those
benefits against any losses sustained by the parents by virtue
of the child's birth.14
2. Offsetting Benefits
Allowing the trier of fact to offset the benefits of
parenthood against the plaintiff parents' claimed losses in an
attempt to accurately assess damages is entirely consistent
with the principles of tort law. The so-called "incidental bene-
fits" rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to
the plaintiff or to his property and in doing so has conferred
a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in
mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable.147
Several courts have held that it is equitable to apply such a
rule to wrongful birth claims, and it appears there is a trend
toward recognizing the validity of the rule, at least with re-
spect to cases in which the parents seek to recover the costs of
rearing a normal, healthy child.14 8
The rule was first adopted for application to a wrongful
birth action in Custodio v. Bauer.1 49 Several years later, a
146. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
147. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
148. See Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Anonymous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204
(1976).
149. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463.
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Michigan court of appeals applied the rule in the Troppi case
announcing: "[W]e believe that rule to be essential to the ra-
tional disposition of this case and the others that are sure to
follow. The benefits rule allows flexibility in the case-by-case
adjudication of the enormously varied claims which the wide-
spread use of oral contraceptives portends. '150
A number of other courts have more recently adopted the
rule in cases in which parents of a normal, healthy but un-
planned infant have sued for the costs of rearing and educat-
ing the child.151 This recent trend would seem to be a com-
mendable one. Allowing the parents to seek compensation for
the costs of rearing the child - costs which would have been
avoided but for the defendants' negligence - while allowing
the trier of fact to offset the benefits derived from
parenthood, strikes a near-perfect balance between the princi-
ple that a tortfeasor ought to be liable for all damages flowing
from his negligence, and the traditional notion that a child
provides joy and happiness to its parents. Further, use of the
incidental benefits rule would appear to vitiate the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's concern that to allow recovery of child rear-
ing costs would result in damages "wholly out of proportion to
the culpability" of the defendant and place "too unreasonable
a burden upon physicians. '1155 To hold a physician responsible
for the costs of rearing a child whose birth he negligently
caused, reduced by any benefits the parents receive from the
child places liability on the physician which is neither unrea-
sonably burdensome nor disproportionate to the culpability of
his conduct.
As for the parents' refusal to place the child for adoption,
rather than preclude recovery altogether, this event should
simply be one of a number of factors to be considered by a
trier of fact when determining to what extent the child bene-
fits its parents. Other circumstances surrounding the birth
and its impact on the plaintiff parents should be considered
relevant factors in assessing damages. The size of the family,
its socio-economic position, the reason the family sought to
150. 31 Mich. App. at 256, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
151. See, e.g., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Rivera
v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1978).
152. 64 Wis. 2d at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 245.
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avoid another child, and the extent to which the child inter-
feres with established careers of the parents may all be miti-
gating or aggravating factors under the circumstances. 153 Only
when all of these factors are taken into account can the trier
of fact properly assess the impact of the unplanned birth and
award appropriate damages.
While a trend toward adopting and applying the inciden-
tial benefits rule appears in those cases involving normal,
healthy children, a quite different, and somewhat curious
trend has developed in several recent cases involving the birth
of a physically or mentally impaired child after a physician's
alleged negligent failure to detect the defective condition. In
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital,154 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, after emphasizing that the physician, if negligent,
caused the birth of the child but not its defects, held that the
parents' recovery would be limited to "those expenses which
they have reasonably and necessarily suffered and will to a
reasonable medical certainty suffer in the future by reason of
the additional medical, hospital and supportive expense occa-
sioned by the deformities of the child as contrasted to a nor-
mal, healthy child. ' 155 An almost identical result may be
found in a recent Texas decision.1 56
The result in these cases seems to be contrary to funda-
mental common sense. Once it is understood that the defen-
dant physician could have done nothing to remedy the condi-
tion of the child and that his negligence can only be viewed as
a cause of the birth itself, parents of an impaired child stand
in no different position than parents of a normal unplanned
child. But for the negligence of the physician, the costs of
rearing and caring for a defective child could have been
avoided. Allowing the parents to recover only those costs over
and above the costs of rearing a normal, healthy child does
not place them in the position they would have been had the
physician exercised due care. It is as essential, if not more so,
to allow recovery of child rearing costs in a defective child
case as in a normal child case. As one court has observed,
153. See, e.g., Wrongful Conception, 5 Wn.LAM MITCHELL L. REV. 464, 504-06
(1979).
154. 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
155. Id. at 776, 233 N.W.2d at 377.
156. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
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while the parents of a healthy child will ordinarily be required
to support it during .its minority, parents of an impaired child
will, in many instances, need to provide support for a much
longer period of time.1 7
Obviously, an impaired child may provide its parents nu-
merous benefits, just as a normal, healthy child does and, the
trier of fact should be allowed to offset these benefits against
the damages sought by the parents. Thus, although differing
fact situations may lead a trier of fact to reach varying results
in normal, healthy child cases and impaired child cases, the
framework of analysis should be the same. The parents ought
to be allowed to seek all damages they have suffered by reason
of the defendant's negligence, and the trier of fact should con-
sider all relevant, mitigating or aggravating circumstances
bearing on those damages.
IV. CONCLUSION
As suits for wrongful life and wrongful birth become more
common, it is essential that courts develop a meaningful
method for analyzing and evaluating such claims. While
wrongful life actions, brought by a child against another
whose negligence caused the child's birth, have been uni-
formly rejected by courts, the various rationales advanced as a
basis for denying such claims have caused confusion and con-
troversy. Once it is recognized that the child in a wrongful life
action attempts to assert a right not to be born - a right with
no basis in law or reason - courts may refuse to allow a cause
of action and avoid the pitfalls of the traditional "unascer-
tainable damage" approach.
The results of wrongful birth actions brought by parents of
a child born by reason of another's negligence have been much
less uniform and much more confusing. When courts come to
realize that sterilization operations, abortions and other forms
of birth control are entirely consonant with public policy and
that decisions concerning family planning are entitled to the
protection of the state, wrongful birth actions cannot be re-
jected. When characterized as a traditional claim for medical
malpractice, it becomes evident that the plaintiff parents are
entitled to be compensated for all losses caused by the defen-
157. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977).
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dant's negligence, including costs of rearing an unplanned or
impaired child. The trier of fact should be allowed to consider
all relevant circumstances when assessing damages, and offset
the benefits of parenthood against the damages recoverable by
the parents. Only in this way may a proper balance be struck
between the right of the parents to be compensated for their
losses, and the traditional notion that a child provides its par-
ents with innumerable intangible benefits.
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